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This paper explores the use of an intertemporal job-search model
in the investigation of within-cohort and between-cohort income in-
equality, the latter being generated by the heterogeneity of time pref-
erences among cohorts of homogenous workers and the former by the
cross-sectional turnover in the job market. It also o⁄ers an alterna-
tive explanation for the empirically-documented negative correlation
between time preference and labor income. Under some speci￿c dis-
tributions regarding wage o⁄ers and time preferences, we show how
the within-cohort and between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients of income dis-
tribution can be calculated, and how they vary as a function of the
parameters of the model.
1 Introduction
Departing from an exogenous distribution of wages faced by a prospective
worker, job-search models generate several di⁄erent derived probability dis-
tributions of possible interest for the study of income inequality. This fact,
￿This work has been prepared during my 2004 visit to the Department of Economics
of the University of Chicago. I am thankful to the Department for its hospitality and and
to Professor Robert Lucas Jr. for the sponsorship of my visit.
yThis paper has bene￿ted from comments of participants of seminars held at the Getulio
Vargas Foundation, UFRJ and at the University of Chicago.
zGetulio Vargas Foundation Graduate School of Economics (EPGE/FGV).
1though, except maybe for the seminal work of Pissarides￿ s (1974), has not
been explored enough in the income-distribution literature.
First, there is the distribution obtained from the original distribution of
wage o⁄ers by truncation, in which all mass allocated to wages between zero
and the reservation wage is placed at zero. Pissarides￿ s use of a job-search
model to investigate income inequality, for instance, is wholly based on the
range of nonzero incomes of this truncated distribution.
Second, there is the invariant distribution which characterizes the long-
run behavior of the state of the system. And, third, the derived distribution of
long-run average wages (calculated under the stationary convergent measure)
when ex-ante heterogenous workers are grouped into di⁄erent cohorts1 of
homogenous workers.
In contrast with Pissaride￿ s analysis, our approach is based on the two
Markovian long-run distributions last mentioned. Another important con-
ceptual di⁄erence between our approach and Pissarides￿ s is that, while this
author contemplates solely within-cohort inequality, comparing inequality
in two societies with di⁄erent degrees of risk aversion, we investigate both
within-cohort inequality and between-cohort inequality.
In our work, between-group inequality is a consequence of the hetero-
geneity of time preferences among workers. More impatient workers tend
to accept wage o⁄ers that less impatient workers possibly would not. The
theoretical conjecture driving our investigation, regarding this issue, is that
by these means cohorts with more impatient workers end up with lower aver-
age wages in a (Markovian) long-run equilibrium, thereby creating between-
cohort inequality.
Within cohort-inequality, in turn, is generated by the constant turn over
in the job market. At any speci￿c point of time, any cross sectional measure-
ment of incomes in an economy, provided by empirical research, necessarily
incorporates the fact that some workers have just been unemployed, others
are searching, and others are employed within a certain range of wages. This
is the inequality to which we refer as within-cohort inequality. Evaluating it
at the stationary distribution amounts to assuming that the economy is in
its long-run steady state when incomes are recorded.
It is not a purpose of the paper to provide an explanation of the causes of
1We shall from now on use the word ￿cohort￿for a group (possibly a society or an
economy) with a large number of homogenous workers (or, indistinctly, of homogeneous
consumers).
2income inequality between individuals in di⁄erent countries or regions. Our
main objective, complementing Pissarides￿ s seminal work, is exploring the use
of a job-search model in the investigation of income inequality, in particular,
by analyzing how the within-cohort and between-cohort inequalities respond
to the exogenous parameters of the model2.
As a measure of inequality, we shall use only the Gini coe¢ cient of in-
come distribution, and its associated Lorenz curve. It is useful having some
idea of the usual empirical values of this statistic. The 75-country sample
presented by Bulir (2001) shows that the Gini usually varies between around
0.2 (Czechoslovakia 0.195, Finland 0.202 and Sweden 0.229) and around 0.6
(Brazil leads with 0.633, followed by Gabon, 0.630). Latin America has been
one of the regions of the world with the greatest inequality. Ferranti et alli
(2004) report Gini coe¢ cients in the 1990s averaging 0.522 in Latin America,
against the much smaller ￿gures of 0.342, 0.328 and 0.412, for the OECD,
Eastern Europe, and Asia, respectively.
Besides the investigation of the topic of income inequality, the results we
derive here can also be used to provide an alternative explanation for the neg-
ative correlation between income and time-preference parameters. Lawrance
(1991) estimated consumption Euler equations using the Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics and showed that subjective rates of time preferences can be
up to 6 percent higher in the top 5 percent of the income distribution than
in the bottom ￿fth percentile. Two possible explanations of such a pattern
have been o⁄ered by this author. First, credit constraints (in which case
￿nancing the smoothing of consumption during a training period would not
be feasible, leading more impatient consumers to lower investments in hu-
man capital); and, second, the existence of socioeconomic variables which,
following this author, would lead both to time impatience and to a low level
of labor income.
Our alternative explanation for Lawrance￿ s empirical ￿ndings is that more
impatient workers tend to accept lower wage o⁄ers and end up with lower
average wages. Propositions 1 and 3 of this paper show that such a conjecture
is valid under general conditions.
2Other possible ways by means of which impatience can a⁄ect inequality, such as its
e⁄ects on the accumulation of human capital, are not considered here.
32 The Model Without Layo⁄s
Our theoretical analysis has as exogenous degrees of freedom the distribution
of wage o⁄ers taken by the workers, the distribution of the time-preference
parameter among workers, the probability of layo⁄s in each period and the
average time of compulsory unemployment till another wage o⁄er can be
drawn. This last variable can also be interpreted as a required period of
retraining. In the present section we do not consider the probability of layo⁄s.
This is done later in the paper.




; B[0;1); standing for the borelians
in [0;1) and L for the Lebesgue measure in this space, consider a continuum
of cohorts of workers. Each cohort j is composed of large number of workers
with a (one-period) time preference parameter given by ￿j 2 [0;1); where
￿j = H
￿1(j) (1)
In equation (1), j has a uniform distribution in [0;1) and H stands for the
inverse function of a cumulative probability distribution of a random variable
taking values in [0;1); with H0(:) > 0 in all of its domain:
The isomorphism (1) allows us to put di⁄erent probability measures m in
the space where the time-preference parameters take value (also ([0;1);B[0;1))).
For instance, if H is the cumulative distribution function of a Beta (s;v) ran-
dom variable, then ￿j will be distributed as a Beta (s;v). Note that having
H0(:) > 0 allows us to identify each cohort j with its time preference para-
meter ￿j:
In this paper we will endow the space where time preferences take values
with two particular distributions: a uniform distribution in [z;1); 0 < z < 1
and a Beta (s;v) distribution. By varying s and v one can generate di⁄er-
ent measures regarding the time preference parameters. In the case of the
uniform distribution in [z;1) the inverse transformation (1) is easily given
by:
H
￿1(j) = z + j(1 ￿ z); 0 < z < 1 (2)





in this space, the measure q induced by the wage function w: ￿ ! [0;D]:




; we denote by F(t) the distribution
function that (q￿a:e: -uniquely) determines the measure q : F(t) = p(w ￿ t):
Our analysis of the basic decision problem for each worker in each cohort
follows, without signi￿cant changes, Stokey and Lucas￿ s (1989) version of
4McCall￿ s (1970) model of intertemporal job search. A minor modi￿cation of
our model with respect to McCall￿ s is that we make a distinction between
two di⁄erent periods: the period in which wages are paid (￿ t) and the period
it takes the unemployed worker to draw a new wage o⁄er (T). Period ￿ t is also
the period with respect to which the time-preference parameter ￿ is de￿ned,
and is normalized to unity. Both time periods ￿ t and T are taken as given by
consumers.
By assumption, there are two states regarding the consumer￿ s optimiza-
tion problem: w and 0: State \w" corresponds to a job o⁄er of w at hand,
and state \0" to no job o⁄er. In state w the worker can accept or turn down
the o⁄er. If he accepts it, by assumption he stays employed forever with that
wage, leading to the present value w=(1 ￿ ￿): If he does not accept the o⁄er
he will be this period in state 0: Being in state zero the only thing he can
do is wait T periods for a next job o⁄er. During the T periods the worker
receives no income (which can be interpreted as a negligible compensation
wage). The individual is not allowed to voluntarily quit his job in order to
go to the job market again.
Besides this distinction between two time frames, we add to Stokey and
Lucas￿ s version of McCall￿ s model by: i) deriving su¢ cient conditions under
which the average wage in the Markovian long-run equilibrium can be proved
to be an increasing function of the time-preference parameter (this turns
out to be very important in the construction of the between-group Lorenz
curves and Gini coe¢ cients); ii) showing that the average wage is a decreasing
function of the probability of layo⁄s and; iii) deriving the associated within-
cohort and between-cohort Lorenz curves and Gini coe¢ cients when workers
are allowed to have di⁄erent time preferences according to some arbitrary
measure.
The dynamics of the consumer problem is the following: At the beginning
of each (unitary) period, each worker in each cohort j (or, given (1), cohort
￿j) can choose between two actions: accept a job o⁄er or search for a new
wage (w) in T periods. The job o⁄ers are drawn from [0;D] according to the
measure q: q is known by all workers. The worker is not allowed to borrow
or to lend. His consumption ct is equal to his income wt in each period.










5With v(w) stating for the value function, the recursive version of the


















The reservation wage is the wage which makes the consumer indi⁄erent be-
tween accepting or rejecting the o⁄er. In this version of McCall￿ s model, it






(w ￿ ￿ w)dq (4)




[0; ￿ w(bj)](w ￿ ￿ w)dq to the second term in (4) and inte-
grating
R
[0; ￿ w(bj)](w ￿ ￿ w)dq by parts, it can be easily seen that
￿ w




As shown in Stokey and Lucas (1989), the reservation wage ￿ w(j) divides
[0;D] into two regions: the acceptance region A(j) = [￿ w(j);D] and the non-
acceptance region Ac(j) = [0; ￿ w(j)]:
Since all employed workers of a certain cohort j have their wages in A(j);
for any I ￿ A the proportion of wages with w 2 I will be given in the limit3







3Just note that after a certain number of periods, by the convergence of the n ￿ th
order sample statistics to the upper boundary of the distribution (D); all workers in each
cohort will end up after a certain number of periods drawing one o⁄er in their respective
acceptance region. By the convergence of the empirical distribution to the underlying
distribution (Glivenko-Cantelli theorem), measure q emerges naturally. Since only those
o⁄ers in the acceptance area are relevant for the calculation of the average wage, this must
be the region where the integration is performed. Last, a normalization by the q-mass of
A is necessary.
6For a given measure q, the e⁄ect of an increase of j on the average wage
wA(j) is not trivially clear from (5), since the denominator either decreases or
remains constant, but so does the integral in the numerator as well (because
the integrand is nonnegative and the interval of integration is shortened). It
turns out, though, that the division by q(A(j)) precisely o⁄sets the fall of
the measure of the interval of integration (think of the discrete case). By
these means, w0
A(j) > 0 simply because the wages averaged are higher when
j (and ￿j) is higher. We reexamine this issue in Propositions 1 and 3 in the
next Sections.
3 The Between-Cohort Income Distribution
The existence of di⁄erent time preferences between cohorts leads to the
between-cohort income inequality. The Lorenz curve plots the percentage
of total income earned by the economic agents of a certain economy, when
these agents are ordered from those with lower income to those with higher
income.
The Gini coe¢ cient (G) is a ratio between two areas. The ￿rst area is the
one between the the curves f(j) = j and the Lorenz curve L(j). The second
area is the one between the curves f(j) = j and g(j) = 0: In all cases; j runs
from 0 to 1: By integrating:




Suppose, by now, that the income of each cohort j; the Markovian long-
run average wage (wA(￿j)), is an increasing function of the time preference
parameter ￿j: Then, by ordering the population by ￿j (or equivalently, by
j);we are, automatically, also ordering it by income. In this case the Lorenz
curve can be easily expressed as a function of j: Indeed, keeping (1) in mind,
we can de￿ne:
a) the measure of people with time preference equal or less than ￿j :
H(￿j) = H(H￿1(j)) = j; note that (by the hypothesis above) this is also
equivalent to the measure of people with income less or equal than wA(￿j);




0 wA(￿j)dm(￿j); where ￿ wA =
R 1
0 wA(￿j)dm(￿j);
c) the proportion of income earned by the j% poorer workers of the
economy as a function of the population ordered by the size of its income:








By taking the ￿rst and second derivatives, with respect to j; in equation (7)
we get L0(j) =
wa(j)
￿ wA and L00(j) =
w0
a(j)
￿ wA showing that the Lorenz curve is
increasing and (when w0
a(j) > 0); strictly convex.
To enhance the intuition about how heterogeneous time preferences can
generate income inequality, we exemplify below a calculation of the Gini co-
e¢ cient of income distribution. The example is developed under the simplest
possible (nontrivial) measure q, with wage o⁄ers taking only two ￿xed values
in [0;D]:
Example 1 Suppose that the measure q puts mass q1 in w1 2 [0;D] and
mass q2 in w2 2 [0;D]; w1 < w2; with 0 < q1 < 1;0 < q2 < 1 and q1 +q2 = 1:
Regarding the measure m of the space where time preferences take values,












bjEw; if bj ￿ b￿
j; in which case ￿ w < w1
bjw2q2
1￿bjq1; if bj > b￿
j; in which case w1 < ￿ w < w2
(9)
Given the assumption about m, time preferences ￿j = (bj)1=T across the
di⁄erent cohorts take values in [z;1): If (bj￿)(1=T) < z; then all workers in
all cohorts will have an average wage w2; since for all of them the reserva-
tion wage is greater than w1 (this follows from (9 and (8), which imply that
￿ w(￿J
￿) = w1; and from the fact that, in this case, bj > bj￿ for all j):Under
such conditions the Gini coe¢ cient is equal to zero and there is a perfect
income distribution.





1=T ￿ z)=(1 ￿ z); 0 ￿ j
￿ < 1 (10)
8This identi￿cation (made through the composition of two strictly increasing
functions) allows us rewriting equations (9) above with j ￿ j￿ and j > j￿;
respectively, in place of bj ￿ b￿
j and bj > b￿
j: Note that the reservation wage
can be situated below w1 (it is trivially zero when bj = 0) or between w1 and
w2; but (also trivially) it cannot exceed w2:





Ew; j ￿ j￿





In this case, since income is a nondecreasing function of j (because w2 >







j￿Ew+w2(1￿j￿); 0 ￿ j ￿ j￿
j￿Ew+w2(j￿j￿)
j￿Ew+w2(1￿j￿); 0 ￿ j￿ < j < 1
(12)
From (6), upon subdivision of the region of integration into the subintervals




(w2 ￿ Ew)j￿(1 ￿ j￿)
j￿Ew + (1 ￿ j￿)w2
; 0 < j
￿ < 1 (13)
The calculation of equation (13) allows for four possible degrees of freedom:
the discrepancy of the two wage o⁄ers, measured by w2=w1; the probability
that the wage drawn from the distribution is equal to w1 (q1); the range of
time preferences ￿j allowed in the economy, [z;1); which is measured by the
parameter z; and the time between job o⁄ers T.
The sign of the derivatives of the Gini coe¢ cient with respect to these
four parameters depends upon their magnitudes. This follows from (8) and







and that G0(j￿) is positive when j￿ tends to zero and negative when j￿ tends
to one.
9Figure 1 explores some possibilities, regarding these parameters, in the
determination of G. In all ￿gures the x-coordinate is q1: Along each row, the
value of z is kept constant (0 for the ￿rst row, 0:75 for the second and 0:9
for the third row) and w2 assumes the values 1:5; and 5:0, respectively, from
the left to the right. Since ￿j runs from 0 to 1; and so does ￿
T
j ; the ￿gures
can be used with T assuming any value. In all graphs one can observe that
there is a value of q1 strictly between 0+￿ and 1￿￿ that maximizes the Gini
coe¢ cient; this value seems to increase with w2=w1:
The results displayed in Figure 1 are to be understood under the mech-
anism of the job search. In this example, all consumers with j > j￿have
the same income wA = w2: They never accept the wage o⁄er w1: Therefore,
the reason generating the concentration of income is the fact that consumers
with j ￿ j￿do accept w1 when it is o⁄ered, ending up with an average income
Ew < w2: If w1 is never drawn (q1 = 0), or is always drawn (q2 = 1);or if all
time preference parameters are located on or above the cuto⁄ point (b￿
j)1=T;
or if the two wage o⁄ers are equal, there is no concentration of income.
The fact that came up in the example above, that less impatient workers,
as measured by ￿j; end up with higher average wages, is proved (with ￿ = 0)




j(j) and since ￿
0
j(j) is always
trivially positive (by (1)), w0
A(￿j) > 0 implies w0
A(j) > 0: This means that
in this case j orders the consumers from the poorer to the richer, thereby
allowing (as we did in the particular case above) the simpli￿ed construction
of the Lorenz curve denoted by (7).
Proposition 1 The average wage wA is an increasing function of the time
preference parameter ￿j:
Proof. Case1- If Remark 1 in Section 4 is valid and F(w) has a density
function, just make ￿ = 0 in the proof of Proposition 3 of the next Section.
Case 2 - If q has a discrete distribution with masses q1;:::qa1￿1;qa1;:::;qax;:::qan;







i=a1 qi where the integer
a1 satis￿es wa1 ￿ ￿ w ￿ wa1￿1: Suppose that the wages are indexed in nonde-
creasing order:
w1 ￿ ::: ￿ wa1 ￿ wa2 ￿ :::wax ￿ ::: ￿ wan (14)
When j increases by ￿￿ w, either it still happens that wa1 ￿ ￿ w+￿￿ w ￿ wa1￿1;
in which case the average wage remains constant, or that, for n > x > 1;
10wax ￿ ￿ w + ￿￿ w ￿ wax￿1 ￿ wa1: In the last case, the average wage either
increases or remains constant, due to the general fact that, given (14), for







Indeed, this is equivalent to having:
(qax + ::: + qan)
Xi=ax￿1
i=a1




which is true by (14).
4 The General Model
In this section we introduce the possibility that, once employed, any worker
can be laid o⁄, in the beginning of each period, with a ￿xed and known














and the reservation wage is given by:
￿ w(j) =
bj
1 ￿ bj + ￿k
Z
[ ￿ w(j);D]






Proposition 2 The reservation wage is an increasing function of the time-
preference parameter ￿j:
Proof. We want to show that:
￿ w





[0; ￿ w(j)](w ￿ ￿ w)dq to the second member of (15)
and use (note that dF = dq here)
Z
[0; ￿ w(j)]














Su¢ ces, therefore, showing that the term
bj
1+￿k is an increasing function of ￿j:
Note that:
k = ￿j + ￿
2










1 + ￿(￿j + ￿
2











j + ::: + 1)
The denominator is a sum of functions each one of which has a negative
derivative with respect to ￿j: The result follows trivially.
As shown in Stokey and Lucas (1989), from which we borrow the analy-
sis below, introducing the possibility of layo⁄s leads to a more interesting
dynamics. Remember the sets A and Ac de￿ned before. The rules of the op-
timization by the worker de￿ne a transition function P : [0;D] ￿ BD ! [0;1]:
For an unemployed worker (w 2 Ac), the probability of having an o⁄er in
any borelian B ￿ [0;D] is given by q(B). A worker employed with wage w
(in which case, necessarily, w 2 A) can only lose his job (with probability
￿) or keep the same wage next period. Therefore, with probability zero he
will have a wage in a borelian B that does not contain either 0 or w: If the
borelian B contains 0; but not w; or w but not zero, the transition probabil-
ities are, respectively, ￿ and 1￿￿: If it contains both, since these are disjoint
events (because 0 = 2 A), P(w;B) = 1.
We now introduce a new measure ￿t in ([0;D],B[0;D]); representing the
(wage) state of workers of a certain cohort j (the j is omitted), in period t:
Associated with the transition function P is the operator T ￿ which acts
on any probability measures in the space ([0;D],B[0;D]); ￿ in particular: This





12We are interested in calculating the average wage (for a ￿xed j) of di⁄erent
cohorts of the economy in the long run. Therefore, for our purposes it is
important to know the limiting measure of the state of the economy, par-
ticularly for sets C ￿ A (of employed workers). A worker of a cohort j, in
period t+1; is employed with wage w 2 C; if and only if he was unemployed
and got a wage o⁄er w 2 C or he was already employed with wage w in the
beginning of period t+1 and kept his job. Given the assumed independence
of job o⁄ers in each period, we can write
￿t+1(C) = ￿t(A
c)q(C) + ￿t(C)(1 ￿ ￿) (18)
The determination of the long-run measure ￿(C) = limt!1￿t(C) requires
the calculation of ￿t(Ac): Since a worker can only be unemployed in period
t + 1 i⁄ he was already unemployed and drew a wage o⁄er in Ac or was




c) + ￿t(A)￿ (19a)
Taking limits, equation (19a) trivially implies ￿(Ac) = ￿=(￿ + q(A)): Taking





We are now ready to calculate the average wage in each cohort j of the







where ￿ w(j) follows (15). As before, it is not clear at a ￿rst glance if the
average wage is an increasing function of the time preference parameter. We
prove it below for the continuous case.
Remark 1 4F 0(w) exists and is absolutely continuous a.e. in [0;B]; with
F 0(w) ￿ f(w) > 0 for (q ￿ a:e) all w in [0;D]
Proposition 3 Under Remark 1, the average wage is an increasing function
of the time preference parameter ￿j:
4Remember the de￿nition of F(w) as the distribution function determined by q.
13Proof. Using the distribution function F and its respective density func-
tion with respect to the Lebesgue measure in R; it follows from the result
above that the average wage is now given by:
wA(￿j) =
1















[ ￿ w(j);D] w ￿ ￿ w(￿j)dq ￿ ￿ w￿)
(￿ + 1 ￿ F(￿ w(j)))2
@ ￿ w
@￿j
Since @ ￿ w
@￿j > 0 by (4), su¢ ces showing that
R
[ ￿ w(￿j);D](w￿ ￿ w(￿j))dq ￿ ￿ w￿ is an
increasing function of ￿j: Write:
Z
[ ￿ w(￿j);D]
(w ￿ ￿ w(￿j))dq ￿ ￿ w￿ = ￿ w
1 ￿ bj + ￿(kj ￿ bj)
bj
and use (17) to get:
Z
[ ￿ w(￿j);D]
(w ￿ ￿ w(￿j))dq ￿ ￿ w￿ = ￿ w
1 ￿ b + ￿(￿j + ￿
2





The demonstration uses the fact that the probability of layo⁄ does not
depend upon the reservation wage.
Although we have used Remark 1 to prove Proposition3 (though not
Proposition 1), this is not a necessary condition. Indeed, we extend Example
1 below to the case when ￿ 6= 0 (with T = 1) and show that, once more, the
long-run average wage increases with the time preference parameter.
Example 2 This example introduces a probability of layo⁄ ￿ in Example 1.












1+bj￿Ew; if ￿j ￿ ￿j
￿￿; in which case ￿ w ￿ w1
bjw2q2
1￿bj(1￿￿￿q2); if ￿j > ￿j
￿￿; in which case w1 < ￿ w < w2






￿+1; if ￿j ￿ ￿j
￿￿
w2q2
￿+q2; if ￿j > ￿j
￿￿
The existence of the two average wages requires, in (22), 0￿ ￿j
￿￿ ￿ 1, which
implies










which is ensured by (23).
Another possibility we want to check is if the intuition that the average
wage should vary negatively with the probability of unemployment does in
fact hold. The result does not follow at a ￿rst glance from (21). ￿ a⁄ects
the average wage both directly, through the term outside the integral, and
indirectly, through the reservation wage. We know from (15) that, as ￿
increases, the reservation wage falls. Since F is a nondecreasing function
with values no greater than one, ￿ + 1 ￿ F(￿ w(￿j)) increases and the term
outside the integral decreases. The e⁄ect of ￿ on the integral, though, is
positive. Increasing ￿ decreases the reservation wage and, since the integrand
is positive, increases the integral. The ￿nal result is then a combination of
two e⁄ects of opposite sign. Proposition 4 uses a result in the proof of
Proposition 3 to show that the negative e⁄ect outweighs the positive one:













From the demonstration of Proposition 3,
@wA
@ ￿ w > 0 and therefore the ￿rst
term of the second member above is negative. The second term is also triv-
ially negative, as one can observe from (21).
5 The Within-Cohort Income Distribution
In this Section we consider the fact that, within each cohort, a cross-sectional
analysis of income will ￿nd heterogeneous situations among consumers. Some
have just been laid o⁄, others have just turned down a wage o⁄er, while others
are employed with di⁄erent wages, ranging, possibly, from the reservation
wage to the wage at the top of the distribution (here, D). The calculation
of the within-cohort inequality is based on the assumption that each cohort
has a very large number of workers. By the result in probability theory that
the empirical distribution converges almost surely to the actual distribution
(Glivenko-Cantelli theorem), this allows us to use the Markovian stationary
distribution as the distribution of incomes in the cohort.
The tools to measure the within-cohort income inequality are essentially
the same as those presented in Section 3. Proceeding with the calculations,
though, necessarily requires the speci￿cation of a original measure over wage
o⁄ers, q: In what follows, we assume that q is given by the Lebesgue measure




> > > > <
> > > > :
￿
￿+1￿ ￿ w; w = 0
0; 0 < w < ￿ w
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which by (6) leads to the within-cohort Gini coe¢ cient:
G =
1 + 3￿ ￿ ￿ w(￿ w2 ￿ 3￿ w(1 ￿ ￿) + 3)
3(1 ￿ ￿ w2)(￿ + 1 ￿ ￿ w)
(25)
where ￿ w is determined by (15) by making q the Lebesgue measure in [0;1].
￿ Averaging the Within-Cohort Gini Across Cohorts
17In order to have an idea of how the within-cohort Gini compares with
the between-cohort coe¢ cient we need to average it out across all di⁄erent
cohorts. Pyatt (1976) (see also Yao (1999)) has devised a methodology to
make such aggregation. Roughly speaking, the within-index of each cohort
is weighed by the average wage of the respective cohort and averaged out
by the prevailing distribution of cohorts in the economy. We follow such a
procedure in the calculations of example 3 below. Since the average wage is
an increasing function of the time preference, this methodology implies that
within-Gini coe¢ cient of cohorts with higher time preference will be more
important for the mean across cohorts than those with lower time preferences.
￿ No Additivity
Note that the Gini coe¢ cient is not an additive measure of income in-
equality. Therefore, one cannot add the between-cohort (GB) and the within-
cohort (GW) coe¢ cients in order to get a total Gini. However, as it has been
shown by Pyatt (1976), a decomposition of the type G = GB + GW + GO is
possible, with GO standing for a correction due to the overlapping of incomes.
GO is zero when the income of the di⁄erent groups do not overlap. In our
case, such overlapping clearly happens, since individuals from cohorts with
higher average income (higher time-preference parameter) will sometimes be
unemployed with a wage equal to zero, thereby being, temporarily, in a worse
situation than other individuals from lower income cohorts.
The important point to notice, though, is that GO has been shown by
Pyatt to be always nonnegative. For this reason, in example 3 below we refer
to GB + GW as a lower bound (LB) to the overall Gini coe¢ cient of the
economy.
6 Quantitative Considerations
Our next step will be devising a numerical example that can help us getting
some quantitative insight into the problem. In order to do so, we consider a
uniform distribution for the wage o⁄ers and a Beta distribution for the time
preference parameters.
Example 3 In an economy where in each period the workers face a proba-
bility ￿ of layo⁄, suppose that q is characterized by a uniform distribution in
18[0;1]: Using (15) we get:












By (20), the average wage reads:
wA(￿j) =
1 ￿ ￿ w(￿j)2
2
￿
(￿ + 1) ￿ (￿ w(￿j)
￿ (27)
Figures 2 and 3 show how the reservation wage changes as a function of the
time preference and the probability of layo⁄, the ￿rst varying between zero and
one, and the second assuming the (extreme) values 0;0:25;0:50 and 0:75. In
Figure 2, T = 1 and, in Figure 3, T = 6:Figures 4 and 5 repeat the same
procedure regarding the average wage.
The within-cohort income inequality has already been calculated when q is
the [0;1] uniform distribution and is given by (24) and (25).
We now proceed with the calculation of the between-cohort Lorenz curve
LB(k); 0 ￿ k ￿ 1; and Gini coe¢ cient GB. Using (7), (26) and (27), as well
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In the ￿rst simulation below m is the measure of a Beta (114:5;1:01) dis-
tribution function. The parameters have been chosen in order to make the
19(monthly) average equal to 114:5=(114:5 + 1:01) = 0:9913: This corresponds
to an average yearly time-preference of 0:900: 95% of the mass of this dis-
tribution is concentrated on the (yearly) interval (0:6779;0:9972).
The between-cohort and within-cohort Lorenz curves are shown, respec-
tively, in Figure 6 and 7. Equally, the values of both the Gini coe¢ cients,
for di⁄erent values of T and theta, are shown in Table 1 below:
Table 1
Within-Cohort (GW); Between Cohort (GB) and
Lower Bound (LB) Gini Coe¢ cients as a Function
of the Number of Periods to get a Job O⁄er (T)
and the Probability of Unemployment (￿)
T = 6 T = 12
GW GB LB GW GB LB
￿ = 0 0:076 0:031 0:107 0:106 0:042 0:148
￿ = 1=120 0:110 0:018 0:128 0:141 0:024 0:165
￿ = 10=120 0:258 0:005 0:263 0:288 0:007 0:295
The remainder of this section is based on the date generated by the ex-
ample above.
￿ The E⁄ect of Theta
Note in Table 1 (see also Figure 6) that the between-cohort inequality
decreases when the probability of layo⁄increases, whereas the opposite hap-
pens with the within-cohort inequality. Figures 2-5 can help us to understand
the fall of the between-cohort inequality. An increase in ￿ has two e⁄ects.
First, it decreases the reservation wages for the di⁄erent cohorts (Figures
2 and 3), thereby making it more likely that low wage o⁄ers are taken by
workers in di⁄erent cohorts. Second, by being unemployed more frequently,
the average wage of workers in di⁄erent cohorts decreases (Figures 4 and 5),
impoverishing all workers at the same time and decreasing inequality.
The within-cohort inequality increases (see Figures 7 and 8) when theta
increases, for, at ￿rst, two reasons. First, because more mass of the stationary
20distribution is concentrated at the point of zero income, an increasing func-
tion of ￿ (remember that the total mass of this point is equal to ￿=(￿+1￿ ￿ w)):
Second, at the same time, the range of nonzero wages increases due to the
fall (when theta increases) of the reservation wage5.
￿ The E⁄ect of T
Table 1 above shows that by increasing the time period in which new
job o⁄ers are taken one increases the between-cohort inequality (see Figure
6). Longer planning horizons magnify the (usually tiny) discrepancies of
time preference among agents. This point is important when one considers
between-jobs training, an activity that can demand discrete time horizons
taking several years.
With respect to the (averaged) within-cohort Gini, Table 1 and Figure 9
(in which theta = 0) seem to lead to the same positive relation. However,
by increasing the interval of variation of T and making theta = 10/120, as
shown in Figure 10, we conclude the positive correlation between GW and
T does not necessarily hold.
￿ A Comparison with Available Empirical Data
In our formulation of the job-search problem, being employed or not in
the next period is a Bernoulli random variable. Let us call ￿success￿the
event of being laid o⁄ next period. Then the number of periods till the
￿rst ￿success￿occurs is a geometric random variable, with average 1=￿: If
we de￿ne the period in which wages are paid (ﬂ t) as monthly, ￿ = 1=120
translates, in average, one layo⁄ each ten years. For the purpose of our
quantitative assessments of the problem, regarding a comparison with real-
world numbers, we concentrate on this case. Regarding the time-preference
parameter, we consider the Beta distribution with an yearly average of 0:9
and a compulsory time to get a new wage o⁄er of six months.
Such choices lead us to the 1 by 3 submatrice (2;2) in the 3￿2 matrix of
Table 1, where one reads within-cohort and between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients
of, respectively, 0:110 and 0:018: Comparing the lower bound LB = 0:128
to the numbers mentioned in the introduction, this is around 60% of the
order of magnitude of the Gini coe¢ cients of Czechoslovakia, Finland and
5The fact that an increase of the nozero range of the truncated distribution leads to an
increase in inequality has been advocated by Pissarides (1974).
21Sweden, countries where income inequality is very low, or around 20% of that
of Brazil or Gabon, countries located on the other side of the distribution of
Gini coe¢ cients. As one can notice from element 3￿1 in the table, though,
the Gini coe¢ cients of the model increase signi￿cantly when one allows for
higher probabilities of unemployment.
￿ Restrictions
Note that all the numerical results above, upon which we have studied
the model, were based on two arbitrary probability distributions: a Beta
distribution for the time preferences, and a uniform distribution for the wage
o⁄ers. Therefore, the results should be interpreted under this proviso.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have built on Stokey and Lucas￿ s (1989) version of McCall￿ s
(1970) model, in order to explore the use of a job-search model in the in-
vestigation of income inequality. The model leads to both a within-cohort
income inequality, as found in empirical cross-sectional analyses of income
data, and to a between-cohort income inequality, due to the fact that workers
are allowed to have heterogenous time preferences.
Our analysis had as exogenous degrees of freedom the distribution of the
wage o⁄ers taken by the workers, the distribution of the time preference
parameter among consumers, the probability of layo⁄s in each period and
the number of periods it takes for a new job o⁄er to be drawn. In applied
work, such distributions should be estimated from the available data.
From a theoretical perspective, we have adapted Stokey and Lucas￿ver-
sion of McCall￿ s model by allowing the time period in which wages are paid
and the time period in which new wage o⁄ers are made to di⁄er. We have
also derived su¢ cient conditions under which the average wage which emerges
from the long-run Markovian equilibrium can be proved to be a nondecreas-
ing function of the time preference. This point is important in the con-
struction of the between-cohort Lorenz curves. Third, we have shown how
the within-cohort and the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients can be calculated
under di⁄erent distributions of wage o⁄ers and time preferences.
A quantitative idea of the problem was made available through the analy-
sis of three examples. The ￿rst two examples were base on a two-point
distribution for the wage o⁄ers and on a uniform distribution for the time
22preferences. The third example dealt with a uniform distribution of wage
o⁄ers and a Beta distribution of time preferences.
Examples 1 and 2 allowed us to have a measure of how the concentration
of income tends to worsen when the disparity among the di⁄erent wage o⁄ers
increase. We have also seen that the two-point distribution of wages allows
for a wide range of the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient, depending upon the
parameters of the problem.
From example 3 we have learned, regarding the within-cohort inequality,
that both an increase in the rate of layo⁄s or an increase in the time between
job o⁄ers (T) tends to increase it. Regarding the between-cohort inequal-
ity, we have learned that (in contrast to the within-cohort inequality), it
tends to decrease with the increase of the probability of unemployment, and
(in agreement with the within-cohort inequality) to increase with the time
between job o⁄ers. Besides, as one would expect, the greater the range of
time preferences among economic agents, the greater the resulting long-run
between-cohort inequality6. We have also learned that the between-cohort
Gini coe¢ cients that can be generated solely in terms of heterogenous-time-
preferences, under an intertemporal job-search rationale, are of a very low
order of magnitude.
Such considerations suggest a line for further research. A natural exten-
sion of the framework developed here is explicitly modelling the time interval
T as a training period and/or by making it random. The main di⁄erence with
respect to the present analysis is that each time the worker would accumu-
late training, he would draw wages from a more favorable distribution:The
determination of this new probability distribution should then take into con-
sideration the fact that, the higher the (accumulated) training period, the
higher should be the chances of drawing better wages, thereby favoring pa-
tient workers.
6This can be concluded by considering, for the time preferences, beta distributions with
more dispersed mass or uniform distributions in [z,1), with z assuiming di⁄erent values in
[0,1).
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Figure 1: (Example 1) - Reservation Wage, Average Wage and Gini Coef-
￿cients as a Function of q1 (in the x-axis), the Range of Time-Preference








































































Figure 2: (Example 2 )- Reservation Wage as a Function of Time Preference






































































Figure 3: (Example 2) - Reservation Wage as a Function of Time Preference






























































Figure 4: (Example 2) - Average Wage as a Function of Time Preference For




















































Figure 5: (Example 2) ￿Average Wage as a Function of Time Preference for




















































































Theta = 10/120 , T = 12
Figure 7: Within-Cohort Lorenz Curves for Di⁄erent Values of T and Theta

















Figure 8: Average Within-Cohort Gini Coe¢ cient (GW) as a Function of
Theta, T=6















Figure 9: Average Within-Cohort Gini Coe¢ cient (GW) as a function of T
(Theta =0)
















Figure 10: Average Within-Cohort Gini Coe¢ cient (GW) as a function of T
(Theta =10/120)








Non Average Within-Cohort Gni as a Function of T






Figure 11: Non-Averaged Within-Cohort Gini Coe¢ cient (GW) as a function
of T (Theta =10/120), Cohort With Yearly Time Preference 0.9.
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